Our publication of 5 April 2026 analysed a document adopted by the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) on 20 March 2026 and warned of the risks raised by the draft Chișinău Declaration then in preparation. The declaration having been adopted on 15 May 2026, the time has come to set out its context, content and the criticisms it warrants.
Behind welcome reaffirmations of the support of States Parties for the independence of the Court and of their deep and constant commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the Convention), the text adopted does not erase the fact that it is a political act intended to influence the case-law of the Strasbourg Court.
The process was launched following an open letter signed by several European heads of State, including Belgium, even though it is a founding country of the Convention, on 22 May 2025. That letter invited the European Court of Human Rights to « reinterpret » its case-law on migration matters, in particular to facilitate the expulsion of foreign nationals convicted of serious offences. It was followed by an informal Ministerial Conference held in Strasbourg on 10 December 2025, and then by a draft declaration adopted by the CDDH on 20 March 2026.
The Chișinău Declaration follows the architecture proposed by the CDDH. It is structured around five thematic blocks on migration: expulsion and extradition, mass arrivals of migrants, the instrumentalisation of migration, decision-making in migration cases, and « new approaches », among which the processing of applications for international protection in a third country, « return hubs » in third countries and cooperation with transit countries.
As early as 27 May 2025, six Belgian public institutions issued a joint call in reaction to the heads of State letter. The Federal Institute for Human Rights (IFDH), the Central Council for Prison Supervision (CCSP), the Institute for the Equality of Women and Men (IEFH), Myria, the Service to Combat Poverty, Insecurity and Social Exclusion and Unia called on the Belgian federal authorities to reaffirm their support for the Court and for the Convention.
Their call, which has therefore been heard, rested on four observations. The letter of the heads of State forms part of a growing trend not to execute or to call into question judicial decisions, including in Belgium (prison conditions, reception of applicants for international protection, length of proceedings).
These institutions further recalled that the Strasbourg Court does not prevent expulsions. It prohibits the removal of a person to a country where he or she would face a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. The prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable, including for persons convicted of offences, a point firmly underlined by the Belgian human rights institutions.
They further stressed that political authorities cannot bring pressure to bear on courts entrusted with reviewing the protection of fundamental rights. On that point, the damage has been done and the danger has not been averted.
The current violations of the rule of law by the Belgian government also remain a regrettable reality, which sits uneasily with declarations of principle on the country's attachment to the Convention. It bears recalling that Belgium has been notable for its failure to comply with several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular in migration matters.
The debate surrounding the Chișinău Declaration goes beyond the migration question alone. It touches the very foundations of the rule of law in Europe.
In a State governed by the rule of law, judicial decisions are enforced. Courts, whether national or international, cannot be subjected to political pressure. The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted precisely to shield the protection of fundamental rights from the vagaries of political power. The independence of the Strasbourg Court is not an institutional privilege: it is a guarantee for each individual within the jurisdiction of a State Party.
The problem is not only political. It is also structural. National asylum systems are chronically underfunded, including in Belgium. Delays in processing applications, the lack of reception places and the congestion of courts and tribunals do not result from an excess of fundamental rights: they result from a deficit of resources.
In the meantime, it is useful to highlight that the Chișinău Declaration restates the following principles:
- On Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), the declaration recalls that this prohibition is absolute, admits of no derogation and authorises no legitimate interference.
By contrast, it confirms that the threshold of severity must remain « high and consistent », that formulation, presented as a reminder, is in reality a purely political signal addressed to the Court and a highly questionable reading of the Paposhvili v. Belgium case-law. - On Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), the declaration emphasises the margin of appreciation of national authorities: where the latter have carried out a balancing exercise in line with the criteria of the Court's case-law, the Court should have « strong reasons » to substitute its own view for that of the domestic courts. The declaration takes the same formulation for the Convention as a whole. This insistence on the national margin is the central axis of the declaration.
These orientations directly affect practice in Belgium, where issues of expulsion, family reunification and medical residence are the subject of regular litigation before the Council for Alien Law Litigation (CCE) and before the civil courts.
Thus, even though the preamble of the declaration reaffirms « the deep and constant commitment of States Parties to the Convention » and « the support of States Parties for the independence of the European Court of Human Rights and for the integrity of the Convention system », these formulae deceive no one. The content of the declaration remains an attempt to reduce the practical reach of the protection afforded by the Convention in migration matters.
The declaration states that the quality of healthcare available in the State of destination should give rise to a real risk under Article 3 only « in very exceptional circumstances described in the case-law of the Court », and that there is no obligation for the expelling State to remedy disparities between its own healthcare system and the level of treatment existing in the State of destination. That paragraph is squarely aimed at the Grand Chamber case-law in Paposhvili v. Belgium (no. 41738/10, 13 December 2016), which precisely extended the protection of Article 3 to seriously ill foreign nationals exposed to a real risk of serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health on account of the absence or inaccessibility of treatment in the country of destination. Asking the Court to apply that case-law in a « very exceptional » manner amounts to inviting, by way of a political declaration, a softening of an established jurisprudential standard. Belgium, which was condemned precisely in Paposhvili, cannot claim to support the Convention while supporting this inflection.
The declaration states that « the use of diplomatic assurances could remove a risk of violation of Article 3 following expulsion or extradition ». That formulation, presented as neutral, is not. The Court has strictly framed the use of diplomatic assurances in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom (no. 8139/09, 17 January 2012), which set out eleven cumulative criteria for assessing their reliability. Doctrine and NGOs have documented, in extensive literature, the unreliable character of diplomatic assurances obtained from States whose respect for human rights is precisely what is at issue. An assurance is a guarantee only if it can be verified and is enforceable. Asking States to negotiate with regimes whose violation of the absolute prohibition of torture is precisely the reason why Article 3 stands in the way of return amounts to institutionalising a fiction. The prohibition of torture is absolute; it cannot be circumvented by exchanges of letters between chancelleries or other questionable steps which we also see from the Belgian authorities.
These points illustrate that the declaration indeed amounts to political pressure.
The independence of judges and respect for the democratic values enshrined notably by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights must continue to be invoked.
The rule of law is not up for negotiation.
Céline Verbrouck
Attorney at the Brussels Bar
Specialised in immigration law, nationality law and international family law
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